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Abstract
Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a cru-
cial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however,
deals almost exclusively with classical attackers. If we accept that quantum information processing is
the most realistic model of physically feasible computation, then we must ask: what classical protocols
remain secure against quantum attackers?
Our main contribution is showing the existence of classical two-party protocols for the secure eval-
uation of any polynomial-time function under reasonable computational assumptions (for example, it
suffices that the learning with errors problem be hard for quantum polynomial time). Our result shows
that the basic two-party feasibility picture from classical cryptography remains unchanged in a quantum
world.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in
the development of modern cryptography. Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [38], building on the develop-
ment of zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems [40, 39], showed that SFE protocols exist for any polynomial-
time function under mild assumptions (roughly, the existence of secure public-key cryptosystems). Research
into the design and analysis of such protocols is now a large subfield of cryptography; it has also driven im-
portant advances in more traditional areas of cryptography such as the design of encryption, authentication
and signature schemes.
The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical attackers. How-
ever, given our current understanding of physics, quantum information processing is the most realistic model
of physically feasible computation. It is natural to ask: what classical protocols remain secure against quan-
tum attackers? In many cases, even adversaries with modest quantum computing capabilities, such as the
ability to share and store entangled photon pairs, are not covered by existing proofs of security.
Clearly not all protocols are secure: we can rule out anything based on the computational hardness of
factoring, the discrete log [65], or the principal ideal problem [45]. More subtly, the basic techniques used
to reason about security may not apply in a quantum setting. For example, some information-theoretically
secure two-prover ZK and commitment protocols are analyzed by viewing the provers as long tables that
are fixed before queries are chosen by the verifier; quantum entanglement breaks that analysis and some
protocols are insecure against colluding quantum provers (Cre´peau et al., [23]).
In the computational realm, rewinding is a key technique for basing the security of a protocol on the
hardness of some underlying problem. Rewinding proofs consist of a mental experiment in which the ad-
versary is run multiple times using careful variations of a given input. At first glance, rewinding seems
impossible with a quantum adversary since running it multiple times might modify the entanglement be-
tween its internal storage and an outside reference system, thus changing the overall system’s behavior.
In a breakthrough paper, Watrous [72] showed that a specific type of zero-knowledge proof (3-round,
GMW-style protocols) can be proven secure using a rewinding argument tailored to quantum adversaries.
Damga˚rd and Lunemann [24] showed that a similar analysis can be applied to a variant of Blum’s coin
flipping protocol. Hallgren et al. [46] showed certain classical transformations from honest-verifier to
malicious-verifier ZK can be modified to provide security against malicious quantum verifiers. Some
information-theoretically secure classical protocols are also known to resist quantum attacks [20, 7, 32, 68].
Finally, there is a longer line of work on protocols that involve quantum communication, dating back to
Bennett and Brassard [8]. Overall, however, little is known about how much of the classical theory can be
carried over to quantum settings. See “Related Work”, below, for more detail.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our main contribution is showing the existence of classical two-party protocols for the secure evaluation of
any polynomial-time function under reasonable computational assumptions (for example, it suffices that the
learning with errors problem [64] be hard for quantum polynomial time). Our result shows that the basic
two-party feasibility picture from classical cryptography remains unchanged in a quantum world. The only
two-party general SFE protocols which had previously been analyzed in the presence of quantum attackers
required quantum computation and communication on the part of the honest participants (e.g. [21, 27]).
In what follows, we distinguish two basic settings: in the stand-alone setting, protocols are designed
to be run in isolation, without other protocols running simultaneously; in network settings, the protocols
must remain secure even when the honest participants are running other protocols (or copies of the same
protocol) concurrently. Protocols proven secure in the universal composability (UC) model [13] are secure
in arbitrary network settings, but UC-security is impossible to achieve in many scenarios.
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Our contributions can be broken down as follows:
General Modeling of Stand-Alone Security with Quantum Adversaries. We describe a security model
for two-party protocols in the presence of a quantum attackers. Proving security in this model amounts
to showing that a protocol for computing a function f behaves indistinguishably from an “ideal” protocol
in which f is computed by a trusted third party, which we call the ideal functionality F . Our model is a
quantum analogue of the model of stand-alone security developed by Canetti [12] in the classical setting.
It slightly generalizes the existing model of Damga˚rd et al. [27] in two ways. First, our model allows
for protocols in which the ideal functionalities process quantum information (rather than only classical
functionalities). Second, it allows for adversaries that take arbitrary quantum advice, and for arbitrary
entanglement between honest and malicious players’ inputs. Our model may be viewed as a restriction of
the quantum UC model of Unruh [68] to noninteractive distinguishers, and we use that connection in our
protocol design (see below). We also discuss possible variants of quantum stand-alone models and initiate a
study on their relationships, which connects to interesting questions in a broad scope.
We show a sequential modular composition theorem for protocols analyzed in our model. Roughly, it
states that one can design protocols modularly, treating sub-protocols as equivalent to their ideal versions
when analyzing security of a high-level protocol. While the composition result of Damga˚rd et al. [27] allows
only for classical high-level protocols, our result holds for arbitrary quantum protocols.
Classical Zero-knowledge Arguments of Knowledge Secure Against Quantum Adversaries. We con-
struct a classical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) protocol that can be proven secure in
our stand-alone model. Our construction is “witness-extendable” (Lindell [50]), meaning that one can sim-
ulate an interaction with a malicious prover and simultaneously extract a witness of the statement whenever
the prover succeeds. Our security proof overcomes a limitation of the previous construction of (two-party)
quantum proofs of knowledge (Unruh [70]), which did not have a simulator for malicious provers. Such a
simulator is important since it allows one to analyze security when using a proof of knowledge as a subpro-
tocol. As in the classical case, our ZKAoK protocol is an important building block in designing general SFE
protocols.
The main idea behind our construction is to have the prover and verifier first execute a weak coin-flipping
protocol to generate a public key for a special type of encryption scheme. The prover encrypts his witness
with respect to this public key and proves consistency of his ciphertext with the statement x using the ZK
protocols analyzed by Watrous [72]. A simulator playing the role of the verifier can manipulate the coin-
flipping phase to generate a public key for which she knows the secret key, thus allowing her to extract
the witness without needing to rewind the prover. A simulator playing the role of the prover, on the other
hand, cannot control the coin flip (to our knowledge) but can ensure that the public key is nearly random.
If the encryption scheme satisfies additional properties (that can be realized under widely used lattice-type
assumptions), we show that the verifier’s view can nonetheless be faithfully simulated.
Classical UC Protocols in a Quantum Context: Towards Unruh’s Conjecture. We show that a large
class of protocols which are UC-secure against computationally bounded classical adversaries are also UC-
secure against quantum adversaries. Unruh [68] showed that any classical protocol which is proven UC-
secure against unbounded classical adversaries is also UC-secure against unbounded quantum adversaries.
He conjectured (roughly, see [68] for the exact statement) that classical arguments of computational UC
security should also go through as long as the underlying computational primitives are not easily breakable
by quantum computers.
We provide support for this conjecture by describing a family of classical security arguments that go
through verbatim with quantum adversaries. We call these arguments “simple hybrid arguments”. They use
rewinding neither in the simulation nor in any of the steps that show the correctness of simulation.1
1In general, it is hard to clearly define what it means for a security proof to “not use rewinding”. It is not enough for the
protocol to have a straight-line simulator, since the proof of the simulator’s correctness might still employ rewinding. Simple
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Our observation allows us to port a general result of Canetti et al. [15] to the quantum setting. We obtain
the following: in theFZK-hybrid model, where a trusted party implementing ZKAoK is available, there exist
classical protocols for the evaluation of any polynomial-time function f that are UC-secure against quantum
adversaries under reasonable computational assumptions. As an immediate corollary, we get a classical
protocol that quantum-UC emulates the ideal functionality FCF for coin-flipping, assuming UC-secure ZK.
New Classical UC Protocols Secure Against Quantum Attacks. We construct new two-party protocols
that are UC-secure against quantum adversaries. Adapting ideas from Lindell [50], we show a constant-
round classical coin-flipping protocol from ZK (i.e. in FZK-hybrid model). Note that the general feasibil-
ity result from above already implies the existence of a quantum-UC secure coin-flipping protocol, but it
needs polynomially many rounds. Conversely, we can also construct a constant-round classical protocol
for ZKAoK that is UC-secure against quantum adversaries, assuming a trusted party implementing coin-
flipping, i.e. in the FCF-hybrid model (essentially equivalent to the common reference string model, where
all participants have access to a common, uniformly distributed bit string). This establishes the equivalence
between FZK and FCF in the quantum UC model, which may be of independent interest, e.g., in simplifying
protocol designs. It has also motivated a subsequent work by Fehr et el. [34] where they showed interesting
connections between ideal functionalities in the quantum-UC model in a systematic way.
Implications. The modular composition theorem in our stand-alone model allows us to get the general
feasibility result below by combining our stand-alone ZKAoK protocol and the UC-secure protocols in
FZK-hybrid model:
Under standard assumptions, there exist classical SFE protocols in the plain model (without a shared
random string) which are stand-alone-secure against static quantum adversaries. This parallels the classic
result of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [38].
The equivalence of zero-knowledge and coin-flipping functionalities in the UC model also has inter-
esting implications. First, the availability of a common reference string (CRS) suffices for implementing
quantum-UC secure protocols. Secondly, given our stand-alone ZKAoK protocol, we get a quantum stand-
alone coin-flipping protocol.
Independently of our work, Lunemann and Nielsen [54], via a different route, also showed the exis-
tence of classical two-party SFE protocols secure against quantum attacks. See the discussion at the end of
“Related Work”.
1.2 Related work
In addition to the previous work mentioned above, we expand here on three categories of related efforts.
Composition Frameworks for Quantum Protocols. Systematic investigations of the composition prop-
erties of quantum protocols are relatively recent. Canetti’s UC framework and Pfitzmann and Waidner’s
closely related reactive functionality framework were extended to the world of quantum protocols and ad-
versaries by Ben-Or and Mayers [5] and Unruh [67, 68]. These frameworks (which share similar semantics)
provide extremely strong guarantees—security in arbitrary network environments. They were used to ana-
lyze a number of unconditionally secure quantum protocols (key exchange [6] and multi-party computation
with honest majorities [7]). However, many protocols are not universally composable, and Canetti [13]
showed that classical protocols cannot UC-securely realize even basic tasks such as commitment and zero-
knowledge proofs without some additional setup assumptions such as a CRS or public-key infrastructure.
Damga˚rd et al.[27], building on work by Fehr and Schaffner [32], proposed a general composition
framework which applies only to secure quantum protocols of a particular form (where quantum commu-
nication occurs only at the lowest levels of the modular composition). As noted earlier, our model is more
general and captures both classical and quantum protocols. Recently, Maurer and Renner proposed a new
hybrid arguments provide a clean, safe subclass of arguments that go through with quantum adversaries.
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composable framework called Abstract Cryptography [55], and it has been adapted to analyzing quantum
protocols as well [29].
Analyses of Quantum Protocols. The first careful proofs of security of quantum protocols were for key ex-
change (Mayers [57], Lo and Chau [53], Shor and Preskill [66], Beaver [2]). Research on quantum protocols
for two-party tasks such as coin-flipping, bit commitment and oblivious transfer dates back farther [11, 9],
though some initially proposed protocols were insecure [57]. The first proofs of security of such proto-
cols were based on computational assumptions [28, 21]. They were highly protocol-specific and it was not
known how well the protocols composed. The first proofs of security using the simulation paradigm were
for information-theoretically-secure protocols for multi-party computations assuming a strict majority of
honest participants [20, 22, 7]. More recently, Dupuis et al. [30, 31] constructed two-party quantum proto-
cols for evaluating arbitrary unitary operations, which they proved secure under reasonable computational
assumptions in a simulation-based definition similar to what we propose in this work. There was also a line
of work on the bounded quantum storage model [26, 25, 32, 69] developed tools for reasoning about spe-
cific types of composition of two-party protocols, under assumptions on the size of the adversary’s quantum
storage. Many tools have been developed in recent years on modeling and analyzing composable security
for protocols of device-independent quantum key-exchange and randomness expansion [33, 71, 58, 18].
Straight-Line Simulators and Code-Based Games. As mentioned above, we introduce “simple hybrid ar-
guments” to capture a class of straightforward security analyses that go through against quantum adversaries.
Several formalisms have been introduced in the past to capture classes of “simple” security arguments. To
our knowledge, none of them is automatically compatible with quantum adversaries. For example, straight-
line black-box simulators [49] do not rewind the adversary nor use an explicit description of its random
coins; however, it may be the case that rewinding is necessary to prove that the straight-line simulator is
actually correct. In a different vein, the code-based games of Bellare and Rogaway [4] capture a class of
hybrid arguments that can be encoded in a clean formal language; again, however, the arguments concerning
each step of the hybrid may still require rewinding.
Independent Work. Lunemann and Nielsen [54] independently obtained similar results to the ones de-
scribed here, via a slightly different route. Specifically, they start by constructing a stand-alone coin-flipping
protocol that is fully simulatable against quantum poly-time adversaries. Then they use the coin-flipping
protocol to construct a stand-alone ZKAoK protocol, and finally by plugging into the GMW construction,
they get quantum stand-alone-secure two-party SFE protocols as well. The computational assumptions in
the two works are similar and the round complexities of the stand-alone SFE protocols are both polynomial
in the security parameter. Our approach to composition is more general, however, leading to results that also
apply (in part) to the UC model.
1.3 Future Directions
Our work suggests a number of straightforward conjectures. For example, it is likely that our techniques
in fact apply to all the results in CLOS (multi-party, adaptive adversaries) and to corresponding results in
the “generalized” UC model [16]. Essentially all protocols in the semi-honest model seem to fit the simple
hybrids framework, in particular protocols based on Yao’s garbled-circuits framework (e.g. [3]). It is also
likely that existing proofs in security models which allow super-polynomial simulation (e.g., [62, 63, 1])
will carry through using a similar line of argument to the one here.
However, our work leaves open some basic questions: for example, can we construct constant-round ZK
with negligible completeness and soundness errors against quantum verifiers? Watrous’s technique does not
immediately answer it since sequential repetition seems necessary in his construction to reduce the sound-
ness error. A quick look at classical constant-round ZK (e.g., [35]) suggests that witness-indistinguishable
proofs of knowledge are helpful. Is it possible to construct constant-round witness-extendable WI proofs of
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knowledge? Do our analyses apply to extensions of the UC framework, such the generalized UC framework
of Canetti et al. [16]? Finally, more generally, which other uses of rewinding can be adapted to quantum
adversaries? Aside from the original work by Watrous [72], Damga˚rd and Lunemann [24] and Unruh [70]
have shown examples of such adaption.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews basic notations and def-
initions. In Section 3, we propose our quantum stand-alone security model. We show our main result
in Section 4. Specifically, Section 4.1 establishes quantum-UC secure protocols in FZK-hybrid model. A
quantum stand-alone-secure ZKAoK protocol is developed in Section 4.2. Finally in Section 5, we discuss
equivalence of FZK and FCF.
2 Preliminaries
For m ∈ N, [m] denotes the set {1, . . . ,m}. We use n ∈ N to denote a security parameter. The security
parameter, represented in unary, is an implicit input to all cryptographic algorithms; we omit it when it is
clear from the context. Quantities derived from protocols or algorithms (probabilities, running times, etc.)
should be thought of as functions of n, unless otherwise specified. A function f (n) is said to be negligible
if f = o(n−c) for any constant c, and negl(n) is used to denote an unspecified function that is negligible in
n. We also use poly(n) to denote an unspecified function f (n) = O(nc) for some constant c. When D is
a probability distribution, the notation x ← D indicates that x is a sample drawn according to D. When D
is a finite set, we implicitly associate with it the uniform distribution over the set. If D(·) is a probabilistic
algorithm, D(y) denotes the distribution over the output of D corresponding to input y. We will sometimes
use the same symbol for a random variable and for its probability distribution when the meaning is clear
from the context. Let X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N be two ensembles of binary random variables. We
call X,Y indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y, if |Pr(Xn = 1)− Pr(Yn = 1)| ≤ negl(n).
We assume the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of quantum information theory (see, e.g., [61]).
We use a sans serif letter (e.g. X) to denote both a quantum register and the corresponding Hilbert space.
We use Xn if we want to be specific about the security parameter. Let Hn denote the space for n qubits.
Let D (X) be the set of density operators acting on space X and L (X,Y) be the set of linear operators from
space X to Y.
Quantum Machine Model. We adapt Unruh’s machine model in [68] with minor changes. A quantum
interactive machine (QIM) M is an ensemble of interactive circuits {Mx}x∈I . The index set I is typi-
cally the natural numbers N or a set of strings I ⊆ {0, 1}∗ (or both). We give our description here with
respect to {Mn}n∈N. For each value n of the security parameter, Mn consists of a sequence of circuits
{M(i)n }i=1,...,`(n), where M(i)n defines the operation of M in one round i and `(n) is the number of rounds for
which Mn operates (we assume for simplicity that `(n) depends only on n). We omit the scripts when they
are clear from the context or are not essential for the discussion. Machine M (or rather each of the circuits
that it comprises) operates on three registers: a state register S used for input and workspace; an output reg-
ister O; and a network register N for communicating with other machines. The size (or running time) t(n)
of Mn is the sum of the sizes of the circuits M
(i)
n . We say a machine is polynomial time if t(n) = poly(n)
and there is a deterministic classical Turing machine that computes the description of M(i)n in polynomial
time on input (1n, 1i).
When two QIMs M and M′ interact, they share network register N. The circuits M(i)n and M′
(i)
n are
executed alternately for i = 1, 2, ..., `(n). When three or more machines interact, the machines may share
different parts of their network registers (for example, a private channel consists of a register shared between
only two machines; a broadcast channel is a register shared by all machines). The order in which machines
are activated may be either specified in advance (as in a synchronous network) or adversarially controlled.
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A non-interactive quantum machine (referred to as QTM hereafter) is a QIM M with network register
empty and it runs for only one round (for all n). This is equivalent to the quantum Turing machine model
(see [73]).
A classical interactive Turing machine is a special case of a QIM, where the registers only store classical
strings and all circuits are classical. This is also called an interactive Turing machine (ITM) with advice
(Canetti [12, 13]).
Indistinguishability of Quantum States. Let ρ = {ρn}n∈N and η = {ηn}n∈N be ensembles of mixed
states indexed by n ∈ N, where ρn and ηn are both r(n)-qubit states for some polynomially bounded
function r. We first define a somewhat weak notion of indistinguishability of quantum state ensembles.
Definition 2.1 ((t, ε)-weakly indistinguishable states). We say two quantum state ensembles ρ = {ρn}n∈N
and η = {ηn}n∈N are (t, ε)-weakly indistinguishable, denoted ρ ≈t,εwqc η, if for every t(n)-time QTM Z ,
|Pr[Z(ρn) = 1]− Pr[Z(ηn) = 1]| ≤ ε(n) .
The states ρ and η are called weakly computationally indistinguishable, denoted ρ ≈wqc η, if for ev-
ery polynomial t(n), there exists a negligible ε(n) such that ρn and ηn are (t, ε)-weakly computationally
indistinguishable.
A stronger notion of indistinguishability of quantum states was proposed by Watrous [72, Definition 2].
The crucial distinction is that a distinguisher is allowed to take quantum advice.
Definition 2.2 ((t, ε)-indistinguishable states). We say two quantum state ensembles ρ = {ρn}n∈N and
η = {ηn}n∈N are (t, ε)-indistinguishable, denoted ρ ≈t,εqc η, if for every t(n)-time QTM Z and any mixed
state σn,
|Pr[Z(ρn ⊗ σn) = 1]− Pr[Z(ηn ⊗ σn) = 1]| ≤ ε(n) .
The states ρ and η are called quantum computationally indistinguishable, denoted ρ ≈qc η, if for every
polynomial t(n), there exists a negligible ε(n) such that ρn and ηn are (t, ε)-indistinguishable.
The two definitions above subsume classical distributions as a special case, since classical distributions
can be represented by density matrices that are diagonal with respect to the standard basis.
Indistinguishability of Quantum Machines. Now we introduce the notion of distinguishing two QTMs.
Definition 2.3 ((t, ε)-indistinguishable QTMs). We say two QTMs M1 and M2 are (t, ε)-indistinguishable,
denoted M1 ≈t,εqc M2, if for any t(n)-time QTM Z and any mixed state σn ∈ D (Sn ⊗ Rn), where Rn is an
arbitrary reference system,∣∣∣Pr[Z((M1 ⊗ 1L(R))σn) = 1]− Pr[Z((M2 ⊗ 1L(R))σn) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε(n) .
Machines M1 and M2 are called quantum computationally indistinguishable, denoted M1 ≈qc M2, if
for every polynomial t(n), there exists a negligible ε(n) such that M1 and M2 are (t, ε)-computationally
indistinguishable.
This definition is equivalent to quantum computationally indistinguishable super-operators proposed by
Watrous [72, Definition 6]. If we do not restrict the running time of the distinguisher, we obtain a statistical
notion of indistinguishability. Let TD(·, ·) be the trace distance between density operators.
Definition 2.4 (ε-indistinguishable QTMs in diamond norm). We say two QTMs M1 and M2 are ε-indistinguishable
in diamond norm, denoted M1 ≈ε M2, if for any σn ∈ D (Sn ⊗ Rn), R being an arbitrary reference system,
TD[(M1 ⊗ 1L(R))σn, (M2 ⊗ 1L(R))σn] ≤ ε(n) .
QIMs M1 and M2 are said to be indistinguishable in diamond norm, denoted M1 ≈ M2, if there exists a
negligible ε(n) such that M1 and M2 are ε-indistinguishable in diamond norm.
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Indistinguishability of QIMs. Next, we generalize the definitions of indistinguishability above to inter-
active quantum machines. Let Z and M be two QIMs, we denote 〈Z(σ),M〉 as the following process:
machine Z is initialized with σ, it then provides input to M and interacts with M. In the end, the output
register of M is given to Z and Z generates one classical bit on its own output register.
Definition 2.5 ((t, ε)-indistinguishable QIMs). We say two QIMs M1 and M2 are (t, ε)-interactively indis-
tinguishable, denoted M1 ≈t,εi M2, if for any quantum t(n)-time interactive machine Z and any mixed state
σn on t(n) qubits,
|Pr[〈Z(σn),M1〉 = 1]− Pr[〈Z(σn),M2〉 = 1]| ≤ ε(n).
QIMs M1 and M2 are called quantum computationally interactively indistinguishable, denoted M1 ≈qci
M2, if for every t(n) ≤ poly(n), there exists a negligible ε(n) such that M1 and M2 are (t, ε)-interactively
indistinguishable.
We may call such Z an interactive distinguisher. We can likewise define statistically interactively indistin-
guishable QIMs, denoted M1 ≈qsi M2, if we allow unbounded interactive distinguisher Z .
Remark 1. Quantum interactive machines, as we defined earlier, actually can be seen as a subset of quantum
strategies, formulated in [44]. Namely, a QIM is a strategy in which each channel can be implemented by
a uniformly generated circuit. Therefore we can as well define statistically interactively indistinguishability
using the ‖ · ‖r norm for quantum strategies. See Gutoski [42] and Chiribella et al. [17] for details about
characterizing distinguishability of quantum strategies using the ‖ · ‖r norm.
Ideal functionalities. We sketch ideal functionalities, i.e., the programs of a trusted party in an ideal proto-
col, for a few basic cryptographic tasks.
• Commitment FCOM: At “Commit” stage, Alice (the committer) inputs a bit b and Bob (the receiver)
receives from FCOM a notification that a bit was committed. At “Open” stage, Alice can input the command
open to FCOM who then sends Bob b.
• Oblivious Transfer FOT: Alice (the sender) inputs 2 bits (s0, s1) and Bob (the receiver) inputs a selection
bit c ∈ {0, 1}. Bob receives sc from FOT.
• Zero-knowledge FZK: Let RL be an NP relation. Upon receiving (x,w) from Alice, FZK verifies (x,w)
?∈
RL. If yes, it sends x to Bob; otherwise it instructs Bob to reject.
• Coin Flipping FCF: Alice and Bob input the request 1n to FCF, and FCF randomly chooses r ← {0, 1}n
and sends it to Alice. Alice responds FCF with “acc” or “rej” indicating continuing or aborting respectively.
In the case of “acc”, FCF sends r to Bob and otherwise sends Bob ⊥. Note the functionality is asymmetric
in the sense that Alice gets the coins first. This avoids the complicated issue about fairness, which has been
an active line of research in classical cryptography (see for example [19, 48, 59, 41]) and is beyond the scope
of this paper.
3 Modeling Security in the Presence of Quantum Attacks
In this section, we propose a stand-alone security model for two-party protocols in the presence of quantum
attacks and show a modular composition theorem in this model, which allows us to use secure protocols as
ideal building blocks to construct larger protocols. We also discuss variants of our stand-alone model in a
unified framework. To be self-contained, we review in Section 3.2 the quantum universal-composable (UC)
security model, which is a generalization of classical UC model to the quantum setting.
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3.1 A General Quantum Stand-Alone Security Model
Our model follows the real-world/ideal-world simulation paradigm. It proceeds in three high-level steps:
(i) Formalizing the process of executing a protocol in the presence of adversarial activities. (ii) Formalizing
an ideal-world protocol for realizing the desired task. This is an (imaginary) idealized protocol which
captures the security guarantees we want to achieve. (iii) Finally we say a (real-world) protocol realizes a
task securely if it “behaves similarly” to the ideal-world protocol for that task (Definition 3.3). “Behaving
similarly” is formalized by the notion of stand-alone emulation between protocols (Definition 3.1, 3.2).
Our definition can be viewed in two ways: either as a quantum analogue of Canetti’s classical stand-
alone model [12] or as a relaxed notion of (a variant of) Unruh’s quantum UC security [68]. Prior to
our work, stand-alone security definitions for quantum attacks were largely developed ad hoc2; the first
systematical treatments appear in [32, 27]. Our model generalizes the existing model of Damga˚rd et al. [27]
in two ways. First, our model allows protocols in which the functionalities can process quantum information
(rather than only classical functionalities). Second, it allows adversaries that take arbitrary quantum advice,
and for arbitrary entanglement between honest and malicious players’ inputs. This distinction is reflected
in the composability that the model provides (see details in Section 3.1.2). While the composition results of
Damga˚rd et al. allow only for classical high-level protocols, our result holds for arbitrary quantum protocols.
3.1.1 The Model
We describe our model for the two-party setting; it is straightforward to extend to multi-party setting. We
first introduce a few important objects in our model. We formalize a cryptographic task by an interactive
machine called a functionality. It contains the instructions to realize the task, and we usually denote it by F
or G. While our model applies to both classical and quantum functionalities, our focus in this work will be
efficient classical functionalities. Namely F is a classical probabilistic polynomial-time machine. A two-
party protocol for a task F consists of a pair of interactive machines (A, B). We call a protocol poly-time
if (A, B) are both poly-time machines. We typically use Greek letters (e.g., Π) to denote protocols. If we
want to emphasize that a protocol is classical, i.e., computation and all messages exchanged are classical,
we then use lower-case letters (e.g., pi). Finally, an adversary, usually denotedA or S , is another interactive
machine that intends to attack a protocol. Very often we abuse notation and do not distinguish a machine
and the player that runs the machine. This should not cause any confusion.
Protocol Execution. We consider executing a protocol Π = (A, B) in the presence of an adversary A.
Their state registers are initialized by a secure parameter 1n and a joint quantum state σn. Adversary A gets
activated first and coordinates the execution. Specifically, the operations of each party are:
• AdversaryA: it may either deliver a message to some party or corrupt a party. Delivering a message
is simply instructing the designated party (i.e., the receiver) to read the proper segment of his network
register. We assume all registers are authenticated so that A cannot modify them and in particular if
the register is private to the party, A may not read the content. Other than that, A can for example
schedule the messages to be delivered in any arbitrary way. If A corrupts a party, the party passes all
of its internal state toA and follows the instructions ofA. In the two-party setting, corrupting a party
can be simply thought of as substituting the machine of A for the machine of the corrupted party.
• Parties in Π: once a party receives a message from A, it gets activated and runs its machine. At the
end of one round, some message is generated on the network register. Adversary A is activated again
and controls message delivery. At some round, the party generates some output and terminates.
2E.g., Fehr and Schaffner [32] write: ”It is still common practice in quantum cryptography that every paper proposes its own
security definition of a certain task and proves security with respect to the proposed definition. However, it usually remains unclear
whether these definitions are strong enough to guarantee any kind of composability, and thus whether protocols that meet the
definition really behave as expected.”
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Clearly, we can view Π and A as a whole and model the composed system as another QIM, call it
MΠ,A. Then executing Π in the presence of A is just running MΠ,A on some input state, which may be
entangled with a reference system that will be handed to the distighuisher.
Protocol Emulation. As indicated earlier, a secure protocol is supposed to “emulate” an idealized protocol.
Here we formally define emulation between protocols. Let Π and Γ be two protocols. Let MΠ,A be the
composed machine of Π and an adversary A, and MΓ,S be that of Γ and another adversary S . Informally,
Π emulates Γ if the two machines MΠ,A and MΓ,S are indistinguishable.
Definition 3.1 (Computationally Quantum-Stand-Alone Emulation). Let Π and Γ be two poly-time proto-
cols. We say Π computationally quantum-stand-alone (C-QSA) emulates Γ, if for any poly-time QIM A
there exists a poly-time QIM S such that MΠ,A ≈qc MΓ,S .
Definition 3.2 (Statistically Quantum-Stand-Alone Emulation). Let Π and Γ be two poly-time protocols.
We say Π statistically quantum-stand-alone (S-QSA) emulates Γ, if for any QIM A there exists an QIM S
that runs in poly-time of that of A, such that MΠ,A ≈ MΓ,S .
A B⇧
M⇧,A
Z
0/1
⇡ S B 
M ,S
Z
0/1
1
Figure 1: Quantum stand-alone emulation between protocols.
Remark 2. (i) The adversary S is usually called a simulator because typical constructions of S simulate the
given A internally. (ii) In the statistical setting, we require the complexity of S and A to be polynomially
related. This ensures that the statistical notion actually implies the computational one. See Canetti [12] for
discussion of this issue in the classical context.
Ideal-world Protocol and Secure Realization of a Functionality. We formalized protocol emulation in
a general form which applies to any two protocols. But it is of particular interest to emulate a special type
of protocol which captures the security guarantees we want to achieve. We formalize the so-called ideal-
world protocol Π˜F for a functionality F . In this protocol, two (dummy) parties A˜ and B˜ have access to
an additional “trusted” party that implements F . We may abuse notation and call the trusted party F too.
Basically A˜ and B˜ invokeF with their inputs, and thenF runs on the inputs and sends the respective outputs
back to A˜ and B˜. An execution of Π˜ with an adversary S is similar to our prior description for executing
a (real-world) protocol, except that F cannot be corrupted. Likewise, we denote the composed machine of
F and Π˜F as MF ,S . We state the definition in the computational setting; statistical emulation is defined
analogously.
Definition 3.3 (C-QSA Realization of a Functionality). Let F be a poly-time two-party functionality and
Π be a poly-time two-party protocol. We say Π computationally quantum-stand-alone realizes F , if Π
C-QSA emulates Π˜F . Namely, for any poly-time A, there is a poly-time S such that MΠ,A ≈qc MF ,S .
It is conventional to use EXECΠ,A,Z := {Z((MΠ,A ⊗ 1L(R))(σn))}n∈N to denote the binary output
distribution ensemble of Z that runs on the output state of an execution of Π and A with input (1n, σn).
Likewise, IDEALF ,S ,Z := {Z((MF ,S ⊗ 1L(R))(σn))}n∈N denotes the binary output distribution en-
semble of Z in an execution of the ideal-world protocol Π˜F . Definition 3.3 can be restated as requiring
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MF ,S F
Z
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Figure 2: Quantum Stand-alone Realization of a functionality.
that for any poly-time A there exists a poly-time S such that, for any poly-time Z and state σn, we have
EXECΠ,A,Z ≈ IDEALF ,S ,Z .
Types of Attack. Typically, we need to speak of security against a specific class of adversaries. We have
distinguished two classes of adversaries according to their computational complexity, i.e., poly-time vs.
unbounded time. We also categorize adversaries according to how they corrupt the parties and how they
deviate from the honest behavior defined by the protocol. The standard two types of corruptions considered
in the literature are static vs. adaptive corruptions. Under static corruption, the identities of corrupted
parties are determined before protocol starts. In contrast, adaptive corruption allows an adversary to change
the party to corrupt adaptively during the execution. This work only concerns static corruption.
In terms of what dishonest behaviors are permitted for an adversary, again two classes are considered
standard in the literature: semi-honest (a.k.a. passive or honest-but-curious) and malicious (a.k.a. active).
A semi-honest adversary, after corrupting a party, still follows the party’s circuit, except that in the end it
processes the output and the state of the party. A malicious adversary, however, can substitute any circuit
for the corrupted party. In the definitions of the protocol emulation, unless otherwise specified, the two
adversaries in the real-world and ideal-world must belong to the same class. For example, if A is semi-
honest, S must also be semi-honest.
These notions of different classes of adversaries naturally extend to quantum adversaries, except for one
subtlety in defining semi-honest quantum adversaries. There are two possible definitions. One definition,
which may be referred to as the Lo-Chau-Mayers semi-honest model [52, 56], allows A to run the circuit
of the corrupted party, which is specified by the protocol, coherently. Namely A purifies the circuit of
corrupted party so that all operations are unitary. For example, instead of measuring a quantum state, the
register is “copied” by a CNOT operation to an ancillary register. Another definition forces the adversary
to exactly faithfully follow the corrupted party’s circuit during the protocol execution, so that any quantum
measurement occurs instantaneously and possibly destructively. In other words, in the second model, a semi-
honest quantum adversary A only corrupts a party at the end of the protocol execution, and then processes
the internal state and transcript that the corrupted party holds. This second model is generally weaker than
the first, in the sense that the adversary is more restricted. In this paper, we focus on the second of these two
notions.
3.1.2 Modular Composition Theorem
It is common practice in the design of large protocols to divide a task into several subtasks. We first realize
each subtask, and then use these modules as building blocks (subroutines) to realize the initial task. In this
section, we show that our definition allows such modular design.
Composition Operation. Let Π be a protocol that uses another protocol Γ as a subroutine, and let Γ′ be
a protocol that QSA emulates Γ. We define the composed protocol, denoted ΠΓ/Γ
′
, to be the protocol in
which each invocation of Γ is replaced by an invocation of Γ′. We allow multiple calls to a subroutine and
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also using multiple subroutines in a protocol Π. However, we require that at any point, only one subroutine
call be in progress; that is, we handle sequential composition. This is weaker than the “network” setting,
where many instances and subroutines may be executed concurrently.
We can show that our quantum stand-alone model admits a modular composition theorem.
Theorem 3.4 (Modular Composition: General Statement). LetΠ, Γ and Γ′ be two-party protocols such that
Γ′ C-QSA (resp. S-QSA) emulates Γ, then ΠΓ/Γ′ C-QSA (resp. S-QSA) emulates Π.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. Here we discuss an important type of protocol where the com-
position theorem is especially useful.
Protocols in a Hybrid Model. We next define a hybrid model, in which the parties can make calls to an
ideal-world protocol Π˜G of some functionality G3. We call such a protocol a G-hybrid protocol, and denote
it ΠG . The execution of a hybrid-protocol in the presence of an adversary A proceeds in the usual way.
Now assume that we have a protocol Γ that realizes G and we have designed a G-hybrid protocol ΠG re-
alizing another functionalityF . Then the composition theorem allows us to treat sub-protocols as equivalent
to their ideal versions when analyzing security of a high-level protocol.
Corollary 3.5 (Modular Composition: Realizing Functionalities). LetF and G be poly-time functionalities.
LetΠG be a G-hybrid protocol that C-QSA (resp. S-QSA) realizesF , and Γ be a protocol that C-QSA (resp.
S-QSA) realizes G, then ΠG/Γ C-QSA (resp. S-QSA) realizes F .
  ⇡  0
 
⇧
⇡  0
⇧ / 
0
1
G ⇡  
G
⇧G
⇡  
⇧G/ 
1
Figure 3: Illustration of modular composition theorem: the general case (left) and in hybrid model (right).
3.1.3 Variants of Quantum Stand-Alone Models: A Unified Framework
When defining a security model, there are lots of choices qualifying and quantifying the power of the adver-
saries to account for various security requirements. Here we provide an abstract stand-alone model for both
classical and quantum cryptographic protocols, illustrated in Figure 4, which contains three natural choices
for the adversaries which we think are essential. This abstract model captures all existing stand-alone se-
curity models (including ours) and this allows for a unified study of, and comparison among, these models.
The relationship between these models may be interesting beyond the study of SFE.
The model contains an environment Z and a protocol. Depending on whether the protocol is in real or
ideal world, we have the honest party, the (real-or ideal-world) adversary and possibly the trusted party. Here
we think of the environment as two separate machines: Z1, which we may call an input sampler, prepares
inputs to the players; and Z2 that receives outputs and makes the decision. Now we consider the following
choices:
3In contrast, we call it the plain model if no such trusted set-ups are available.
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Figure 4: Possible choices in defining a security model
(a) Does Z1, the input sampler, have a quantum advice aux1? In other words, do we allow arbitrary input
states or only states that can be generated efficiently?
(b) Does Z2, which is essentially a distinguisher, take quantum advice aux2?
(c) Does Z1 pass a state to Z2? Namely, does the environment keep state during the execution?
Notice that positive answers potentially give more power to the adversaries and thus provides stronger
security guarantee. Also note that all machines are always allowed to take classical advice. We may denote
a security model asM·,·,· where the subscripts are from {aux1, aux1, aux2, aux2, state, state} indicating
each of the choices made for the model. For exampleMaux1,aux2,state corresponds to the model that Z1 gets
quantum advice; Z2 takes no quantum advice and Z1 passes state to Z2 –this exactly leads to our model in
Def. 3.1. Similarly,Maux1,aux2,state is the model where Z1 and Z2 both take quantum advice, and there is
state passing from Z1 to Z2.
We say two modelsM andM′ are equivalent if for any two protocolsΠ and Γ, it holds thatΠ emulates
Γ inM if and only if Π emulates Γ inM′. It is conceivable that some of the 23 = 8 combinations collapse
to the same model. For example, if all players are classical circuits, then all eight modelsM·,·,· collapse.
This is because classical (non-uniform) machines can only measure a quantum state in computational basis
to obtain a classical string from a certain distribution. But a classical circuit can be hardwired with any
classical string, and so (quantum) advice gives no extra power to a classical circuit. Passing state likewise
becomes vacuous.
When we consider an adversary and environment consisting of quantum circuits, the situation becomes
generally more complicated. We can observe that choice (b) becomes irrelevant once we permit arbitrary in-
put state and state passing (i.e.,Maux1,aux2,state ≡Maux1,aux2,state). We conjecture that state passing makes
no difference either. If this is indeed true, then all the variants collapse when Z1 takes quantum advice.
On the other hand, if Z1 takes no advice (i.e. only efficiently generated input states are allowed), we are
left with two variantsMaux1,aux2,· andMaux1,aux2,·. The relationship between these two models is closely
related to the fundamental question in quantum complexity theory regarding BQP/poly ?= BQP/qpoly.
We leave further investigations as future work. In Appendix B, we discuss another variant that appears in
the literature [27, 32], in which Z1 may only generate input states of a special form. We show that this does
not change the model in the case that Z1 takes quantum advice.
3.2 Quantum UC Model: An Overview
So far, our security model falls into the stand-alone setting, where protocols are assumed to be executed
in isolation. However, in practice we often encounter a network setting, where many protocols are running
concurrently. A protocol proven secure according to a stand-alone security definition ensures nothing if we
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run it in a network environment. In view of this issue, Canetti [13] proposed the (classical) Universally Com-
posable (UC) security model. It differs from the stand-alone definition of security in that the environment
is allowed to be interactive: during the execution of the protocol, the environment may provide inputs and
receive the outputs of the honest players, and exchange arbitrary messages with the adversary. In contrast,
the environment in the stand-alone model runs only at the end of the protocol execution (and, implicitly,
before the protocol starts, to prepare the inputs to all parties). UC-secure protocols enjoy a property called
general (or universal) composition4: loosely speaking, the protocol remains secure even if it is run concur-
rently with an unbounded number of other arbitrary protocols (whereas proofs of security in the stand-alone
model only guarantee security when only a single protocol at a time is running).
Earlier work on defining UC security and proving universal composition in the quantum setting appears
in [5, 67]. We will adapt the somewhat simpler formalism of Unruh [68].
Modulo a small change in Unruh’s model (quantum advice, discussed below), our stand-alone model is
exactly the restriction of Unruh’s model to a non-interactive environment, that is one which is idle from the
start to the finish of the protocol. The only apparent difference is that in the UC model, the environment
runs for some time before the protocol starts to prepare inputs, while in Section 3.1 we simply quantify over
all joint states σ of the honest players’ and adversary’s inputs. This difference is only cosmetic, though: the
state σ can be taken to be the joint state of the outputs and internal memory of the environment at the time
the protocol begins.
We make one change to Unruh’s model in order to be consistent with our earlier definitions and the
work of Watrous on zero-knowledge [72]: we allow the environment to take quantum advice, rather than
only classical advice. In the language of [68, p. 11], we change the initialization phase of a network ex-
ecution to create a state ρ ∈ P(HN) which equals the classical string |(ε,environment, ε)〉 in Hclass
(instead of |(ε,environment, z)〉), and an arbitrary state σ in Hquant (instead of |ε〉). Here ε denotes the
empty string. Moreover, we change the definition of indistinguishable networks [68, p. 12] to quantify over
all states σ instead of all classical strings z. This change is not significant for statistical security, since an
unbounded adversary may reconstruct a quantum advice state from a (exponentially long) classical descrip-
tion. However, it may be significant for polynomial-time adversaries: it is not known how much quantum
advice affects the power of, say BQP, relative to classical advice. For completeness, we state this modified
definition of quantum UC security below.
Definition 3.6 (Computationally Quantum-UC Emulation). Let Π and Γ be two-party protocols. We say Π
computationally quantum-UC (C-QUC) emulates Γ, if for any poly-time QIM A, there is a poly-time QIM
S such that MΠ,A ≈qci MΓ,S (as per Def. 2.5).
Here MΠ,A (and MΓ,A likewise) denotes the composed system of Π and A, which can be viewed
as a QIM. Its network register consists of part of the adversary’s network register, and is used for ex-
ternal communication with another party (e.g., an environment). Alternatively, define EXECΠ,A,Z :=
{〈Z(σn),MΠ,A〉}n∈N,σn∈D(Hn) and EXECF ,S ,Z := {〈Z(σn),MΓ,S 〉}n∈N,σn∈D(Hn). We can rephrase the
condition as “for any poly-time QIM A, there is a poly-time QIM S , such that for any poly-time QIM Z ,
EXECΠ,A,Z ≈ EXECΓ,S ,Z .”
If we allow A and Z to be unbounded machines, i.e., we require that MΠ,A ≈qsi MΓ,S , then we
get the notion of statistically quantum-UC (S-QUC) emulation. As suggested in [43], we can also use
the ‖ · ‖r norm on strategies to define it. Namely, we require that for any A there exists S such that
‖MΠ,A −MΓ,S‖r ≤ negl(n).
General (Concurrent) Composition. The most striking feature of UC model is that it admits a very general
4There is a distinction between UC security (a definition that may be satisfied by a specific protocol and ideal functionality) and
universal composition (a property of the class of protocols that satisfy a security definition). Not all definitions that admit universal
composition theorems are equivalent to UC security. See [47, 51] for discussion.
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form of composition, concurrent composition5. Specifically, consider a protocol Π that makes subroutine
calls to a protocol Γ. In contrast to the stand-alone setting, we now allow multiple instances of Γ running
concurrently. (For a formal description of general composition operation, see Canetti [13].) As before, we
write ΠΓ/Γ
′
to denote the protocol obtained by Π by substituting Γ′ for subroutine calls to Γ.
Our modifications of Unruh’s definition do not affect the validity of the universal composition theorem:
Theorem 3.7 (Quantum UC Composition Theorem (Unruh [68])). Let Π, Γ and Γ′ be poly-time protocols.
Assume that Γ quantum-UC emulates Γ′. Then ΠΓ/Γ′ quantum-UC emulates Π.
There is another useful property that simplifies the proof of UC emulation. In both classical and quantum
UC models, it suffices to consider a special adversary, which is called the dummy adversary Adummy. The
dummy adversary Adummy just forwards messages between a protocol and an environment and leaves any
further processing to the environment. Here we only restate the completeness of dummy adversary in the
quantum setting:
Theorem 3.8 (Completeness of the dummy adversary (Unruh [68, Lemma 12])). Assume that Π quantum-
UC emulates Γ with respect to the dummy adversary (i.e., instead of quantifying over all adversaries, we
fix A := Adummy). Then Π quantum-UC emulates Γ. This holds both for computational and statistical
settings.
4 Classical Protocols with Quantum Security
This section studies what classical protocols remain secure against quantum attacks in the computational
setting. Let F be a classical two-party poly-time functionality. For technical reasons, F needs to be well-
formed. See [13, 15] for a formal definition and discussions. Throughout this paper, we only consider
well-formed functionalities as well. Classically, there are two important families of secure protocols:
• Stand-alone secure computation [38]: Assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations,
there exists poly-time protocols that computationally stand-alone emulates F .
• Universal-composable secure computation [15]: Assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor per-
mutations, there exists protocols in the FZK-hybrid model that computationally UC emulates F .
Our main result shows that these general feasibility results largely remain unchanged against quantum
attacks:
Theorem (Informal). For any classical two-party functionality F , there exists a classical protocol pi that
quantum computationally stand-alone emulates F , under suitable quantum-resistant computational as-
sumptions.
The proof of the theorem can be broken into two parts. First we show a quantum analogue of [15]
in Section 4.1. Namely, there exist functionalities, such as FZK, that are as powerful as to realizing any
other functionalities based on them, even with respect to computationally quantum-UC security. To achieve
this, we develop a framework called simple hybrid arguments in Sect 4.1.1 to capture a large family of
classical security analyses that go through against quantum adversaries. As a result, it amounts to design a
(stand-alone) secure protocol for FZK, which is the content of Section 4.2. We stress that security of existing
protocols for FZK relies on a sophisticated rewinding argument, and it is not clear if the arguments are still
valid against quantum adversaries. Hence we need new ideas to get around this difficulty.
5People often refer to this type of composition as UC composition, presumably because security in the UC model implies
generally concurrent composition. This should not cause any further confusion.
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4.1 Basing Quantum UC Secure Computation on FZK
We show here that FZK is sufficient for UC secure computation of any two-party functionality against any
computational bounded quantum adversaries. That is, for any well-formed functionalities F , there exists an
FZK-hybrid protocol that C-QUC emulates F . We stress that these protocols are all classical, which can be
implemented efficiently with classical communication and computation devices.
Theorem 4.1. Let F be a two-party functionality. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a classical FZK-
hybrid protocol that C-QUC emulates F in the presence of polynomial-time malicious quantum adversaries
with static corruption.
Assumption 1. There exists a classical pseudorandom generator secure against any poly-time quantum
distinguisher.
Based on this assumption and the construction of [60], we can obtain a statistically binding and quantum
computationally hiding commitment scheme picom. All commitment schemes we use afterwards refer to this
one. This assumption also suffices for Watrous’s ZK proof system for any NP-language against quantum
attacks.
Assumption 2. There exists a dense classical public-key crypto-system that is IND-CPA (chosen-plaintext
attack) secure against quantum distinguishers.
A public-key crypto-system is dense if a valid public key is indistinguishable in quantum poly-time
from a uniformly random string of the same length. Although it is likely that standard reductions would
show that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1, we chose to keep the assumptions separate because the
instantiation one would normally use of the pseudorandom generator would not be related to the public-key
system (instead, it would typically be based on a symmetric-key block or stream cipher). Both assumptions
hold, for instance, assuming the hardness of leaning with errors (LWE) problem [64].
4.1.1 Simple Hybrid Argument.
Our analysis is based on a new abstraction called a simple hybrid argument (SHA). It captures a family of
classical security arguments in the UC model which remains valid in the quantum setting (as long as the
underlying primitives are secure against quantum adversaries).
Definition 4.2 (Simply related machines). We say two QIMs Ma and Mb are (t, ε)-simply related if there is
a time-t QTM M and a pair of classical distributions (Da,Db) such that
(a) M(Da) ≡ Ma (for two QIMs N1 and N2, we say N1 ≡ N2 if the two machines behave identically on
all inputs, that is, if they can be described by the same circuits),
(b) M(Db) ≡ Mb, and
(c) Da ≈2t,εqc Db.
Example 1. Figure 5 illustrates a pair of simply related machines.
Lemma 4.3. If two machines Ma and Mb are (t, ε)-simply related, then Ma ≈t,εqci Mb, i.e., they are (t, ε)-
interactively indistinguishable (as per Definition 2.5).
Proof. By definition, Ma ≡ M(Da) and Mb ≡ M(Db). If there is a Z with quantum advice σ that
distinguishes Ma and Mb with advantage ε′ > ε in time t, we can construct a time-2t distinguisherD for Da
and Db with advantage ε′ as well. This contradicts Da ≈2t,εqc Db. Distinguisher D works by taking an input
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Figure 5: Two simply related machines: Ma is machine M on input σ chosen uniformly at random; Mb is
machine M on input a pseudorandom string PG(r).
sample d from either Da or Db, simulates 〈Z(σ),M(d)〉, and outputs whatever Z outputs. Obviously, D
runs in time at most 2t and distinguishes Da and Db with the same advantage that Z distinguishes Ma and
Mb. Thus we conclude |Pr(〈Z(σ),Ma〉 = 1)− Pr(〈Z(σ),Mb〉 = 1)| ≤ ε for any time-t environment
Z .
Definition 4.4 (Simple hybrid argument). Two machines M0 and M` are related by a (t, ε)-simple hybrid
argument of length ` if there is a sequence of intermediate machines M1,M2, ...,M`−1 such that each
adjacent pair Mi−1,Mi of machines, i = 1, . . . , `, is (t, ε` )-simply related.
Lemma 4.5. For any t, ε and `, if two machines are related by a (t, ε)-simple hybrid argument of length `,
then the machines are (t, ε)-interactively indistinguishable.
Proof. This is by a standard hybrid argument. Suppose, for contradiction, there exists a time-t machine Z
with advice σ such that
|Pr(〈Z(σ),M0〉 = 1)− Pr(〈Z(σ),M`〉 = 1)| ≥ ε .
Then by triangle inequality we can infer that there must exist some i such that
|Pr(〈Z(σ),Mi〉 = 1)− Pr(〈Z(σ),Mi+1〉 = 1)| > ε/` .
However, by assumption Mi and Mi+1 are (t, ε` )-simply related and in particular no time-t machines can
distinguish them with advantage greater than ε/`.
4.1.2 Lifting CLOS to Quantum UC Security.
Now we apply our simple hybrid argument framework to analyze the protocol in CLOS. We first review the
structure of the construction of CLOS in the static setting:
(a) Let F be a two-party functionality. Design a protocol pi that computationally (classical) UC (C-CUC)
emulates F against semi-honest adversaries. The protocol uses a semi-honest oblivious transfer
(ShOT) protocol, which can be constructed assuming existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations.
(b) Let FCP be the “commit-and-prove” functionality of [15, Figure 8]. A protocol is constructed in
FZK-hybrid model that C-CUC emulates FCP, assuming existence of a statistically binding and com-
putationally hiding commitment scheme. Such a commitment scheme in turn can be constructed from
a pseudorandom generator [60].
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(c) In FCP-hybrid model, a generic complier COMP is designed. Let pi′ = COMP(pi) be the FCP-hybrid
protocol after compilation. It is shown in [15, Proposition 8.1] that: for every classical adver-
sary A′, there exists a classical adversary A with running time polynomial in that of A′ such that
EXECpi′,A′,Z ≡ EXECpi,A,Z . That is, the interaction ofA′ with honest players running pi′ is identical
to the interaction of A with pi in the semi-honest model, i.e., Mpi′,A′ ≡ Mpi,A.
It then follows that, by the UC composition theorem, pi′ C-CUC emulates F in the FZK-hybrid model.
We then show how to make the construction secure against quantum adversaries using proper quantum-
resistant assumptions. The key observation is that the security proofs of the semi-honest protocol and of
the FCP protocol in the FZK-hybrid model fall into our simple hybrid argument framework. Thus once we
augment the computational assumptions to be quantum-resistant, they immediately become secure against
quantum adversaries. This is stated more precisely below.
Observation 4.6 (CLOS proof structure). In CLOS, the security proofs for the semi-honest protocol and
the protocol for FCP in FZK-hybrid model against static adversaries consist of simple hybrid arguments with
t = poly(n) and ε = negl(n).
Moreover, the underlying indistinguishable distributions in the CLOS arguments consist of either (i) switch-
ing between a real public key and a uniformly random string, (ii) changing the plaintext of an encryption, or
(iii) changing the message in the commit phase of a commitment protocol.
From this observation, we get the corollary below.
Corollary 4.7 (CLOS—simple hybrids). (a) In the FZK-hybrid model and under Assumption 1, there is a
non-trivial protocol that UC-emulates FCP in the presence of polynomial-time malicious static quan-
tum adversaries.
(b) Let F be a well-formed two-party functionality. In the plain model, there is a protocol that UC-
emulates F in the presence of polynomial-time semi-honest static quantum adversaries under As-
sumption 2.
Proof. Observation 4.6 tells us there are two types of proofs in CLOS, so we only have to show both can
be augmented to hold against quantum adversaries. On the one hand, simple hybrid arguments in CLOS
still hold if we make assumptions 1 and 2, because the underlying distributions in these hybrid experiments
will remain indistinguishable against quantum distinguishers. On the other hand, we know quantum UC
composition also holds by Theorem 3.7.
More specifically, for the FCP protocol in FZK-hybrid model, the simply hybrid machines in its proof
are related by switching the messages being committed. Hence FCP protocol remains secure against ma-
licious static quantum adversaries under Assumption 1. In the semi-honest setting, an OT protocol can be
constructed from a dense crypto-system (Assumption 2), see Goldreich [37]. Its proof consists of simply
related machines that are related by either switching between a valid public key and a random string (when
sender is corrupted) or switching the plaintext of an encryption (when receiver is corrupted). Therefore,
this protocol C-QUC emulates FOT against semi-honest quantum adversaries. Next in FOT-hybrid model,
the construction for an arbitrary F is unconditionally secure, which, by Unruh’s lifting theorem, remains
quantum-UC secure. Hence quantum UC composition theorem gives that there is a classical protocol that
C-QUC emulates F in the presence of semi-honest static quantum adversaries.
Combining the previous arguments we can prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix a well-formed functionality F and let pi be the protocol for F in the semi-honest
model guaranteed by the second part of Corollary 4.7. Now consider pi′ = COMP(pi). We want to show that it
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C-QUC emulates F . Theorem 3.8 tells us that it suffices to consider the classical dummy adversaryAdummy.
By [15, Proposition 8.1], the interaction of the dummy adversaryAdummy with pi′ (in the FCP hybrid model)
is identical to the interaction of the adversary A with pi (in the semi-honest model). By the security of pi in
the semi-honest model, there exists an ideal-world adversary S such that MF ,S ≈qci Mpi,A ≡ Mpi′,Adummy .
Thus, pi′ securely emulates F in the FCP-hybrid model against malicious adversaries. By the quantum
UC composition theorem, we can compose pi′ with the protocol for FCP to get a protocol secure against
malicious quantum adversaries in the FZK-hybrid model.
4.2 Realizing FZK with Stand-alone Security
In this section, we construct a protocol ΠZK that quantum stand-alone emulates FZK. In the stand-alone
model, FZK is more commonly referred to as zero-knowledge argument of knowledge.
We will use a dense encryption scheme E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) as in Assumption 2. Note that Enc
is a randomized algorithm and we denote by Encpk(m, r) the encryption of a message m under a public
key pk using randomness r, But unless when needed, we usually omit the randomness in the notation and
write Encpk(m). We will also need a result of Watrous’s [72], where he showed that there exist classical
zero-knowledge proofs for any NP language that are secure against any poly-time quantum verifiers. For
completeness we give his definition (adapted to our terminology) of quantum computational zero-knowledge
proof [72, Definition 7].
Definition 4.8. An interactive proof system (P,V) for a language L is quantum computational zero-knowledge
if, for every poly-time QIM V ′, there exists a poly-time QIM SV′ that satisfies the following requirements.
(a) The verifier V ′ and simulator SV′ agree on the polynomially bounded functions q and r that specify
the number of auxiliary input qubits and output qubits, respectively.
(b) Let M〈P,V′〉(x) be the machine describing that interaction between V ′ and P on input x, and let
MSV′ (x) be the simulator’s machine on input x. Then the ensembles {M〈P,V′〉(x) : x ∈ L} and{MSV′ (x) : x ∈ L} are quantum computationally indistinguishable as per Definition 2.3.
Now that we have all building blocks ready, our construction of a classical ZKAoK protocol is as follows.
Theorem 4.9. Protocol ΠZK quantum stand-alone-emulates FZK.
The full proof appears in Sect. 4.2.1. We provide a brief and intuitive justification here. Roughly
speaking, Phase 1 constitutes what may be called a “semi-simulatable” coin-flipping protocol. Specifically
we can simulate a corrupted Prover. This implies that a simulator S can “cheat” in Phase 1 and force the
outcome to be a public key pk of which he knows a corresponding secret key sk, so that S can decrypt e
to recover w in the end. This allows us to show argument of knowledge (in our stand-alone model). On
the other side, although generally we cannot simulate a corrupted verifier in Phase 1, we can guarantee
that the outcome pk is uniformly random if the verifier behaves honestly. This is good enough to show
zero-knowledge, because we can later encrypt an all-zero string and use the simulator for the ZK protocol
in Phase 2 to produce a fake proof. In reality, a corrupted verifier may bias the coin-flipping outcome by
aborting dependent on Prover’s message b for example. This technical subtlety, nonetheless, is not hard to
deal with. Intuitively the verifier only sees “less” information about the witness if he/she decides to abort in
Phase 1.
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ZKAoK Protocol ΠZK
Phase 1
(a) V chooses a← {0, 1}n at random, and sends P a commitment of a: c = comm(a).
(b) P sends b← {0, 1}n to V.
(c) V sends P string a.
(d) V proves to P that c is indeed a commitment of a using Watrous’s ZK protocol.
(e) P and V set pk = a⊕ b and interpret it as a public key.
Phase 2
(a) P, holding an instance x and a witness w, encrypts w under pk. Let e = Encpk(w). P
sends (x, e) to V.
(b) P proves to V that e encodes a witness of x using Watrous’s ZK protocol. V accepts if it
accepts in this ZK protocol. Otherwise it rejects and halts.
4.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.9: Quantum Stand-alone Secure ZKAoK
For the sake of clarity, we propose a non-interactive notion of simple hybrid argument, analogous to Def. 4.4,
which formalizes a common structure in stand-alone security proofs.
Definition 4.10 (Simply related non-interactive machines). We say two QTMs Ma and Mb are (t, ε)-simply
related if there is a time-t QTM M and a pair of QTMs (Na,Nb) such that
(a) MNa ≡ Ma (for two QTMs N1 and N2, we say N1 ≡ N2 if they can be described by the same
circuits),
(b) MNb ≡ Mb, and
(c) Na ≈2t,εqc Nb.
Remark 3. (i) MN is the machine that gives M oracle access to N. (ii) As a typical example of a pair
of indistinguishable QTMs, consider Na being a QTM describing a ZK protocol with a (dishonest) veri-
fier, and Nb being a simulator’s machine. Then by definition of a valid simulator, we have Na ≈qc Nb.
(iii) Machines (Na,Nb) in the definition also capture pair of indistinguishable classical distributions that are
efficiently samplable. Namely, we can let Na and Nb be algorithms that sample from distributions Da and
Db respectively.
Definition 4.11 (Simple hybrid argument (non-interactive version)). Two machines M0 and M` are related
by a (t, ε)-simple hybrid argument of length ` if there is a sequence of intermediate machines M1,M2, ...,M`−1
such that each adjacent pair Mi−1,Mi of machines, i = 1, . . . , `, is (t, ε` )-simply related.
Lemma 4.12. For any t, ε and `, if two machines are related by a (t, ε)-simple hybrid argument of length `,
then the machines are (t, ε)-indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction, there exists a time-t QTM Z with advice σ such that |Pr[Z((M0 ⊗
1L(R))σn) = 1]− Pr[Z((M` ⊗ 1L(R))σn) = 1]| > ε. Then by triangle inequality we can infer that there
must exist some i s.t. |Pr[Z((Mi ⊗ 1L(R))σn) = 1]− Pr[Z((Mi+1 ⊗ 1L(R))σn) = 1]| > ε/`. However,
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by assumption Mi and Mi+1 are (t, ε/`)-simply related and in particular no time-t QTMs can distinguish
them with advantage greater than ε/`.
Remark 4. Actually, the proof of our modular composition can be seen as a simple hybrid argument.
Specifically in step 3, MΠ′,A and MΠ,S are simply related by MΓ′,AΓ′ and MΓ,AΓ .
We now prove Theorem 4.9 following the (non-interactive) simply hybrid argument framework.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. We denote the two ZK proof systems in Phase 1 & 2 by ZK1 and ZK2 respectively.
The two NP languages, formalized below, are denoted by L1 and L2 respectively.
L1 = {(c, a) : ∃r ∈ {0, 1}∗ s.t. comm(a, r) = c}
L2 = {(pk, x, e) : ∃w, r ∈ {0, 1}∗, s.t. Encpk(w, r) = e ∧ (x,w) ∈ RL}
The simulators of ZK1 and ZK2 are denoted by S1 and S2 respectively. We stress that Watrous’s ZK pro-
tocol has negligible completeness and soundness errors, and in addition the simulator succeeds for arbitrary
quantum poly-time verifiers on true instances, except with negligible probability.
Prover is Corrupted. For any real-world adversary A, we construct an ideal-world adversary S .
Simulator S: Prover is corrupted
Input: A as a black box; security parameter 1n.
1. S initializes A with whatever input state it receives.
2. In Phase 1, S does the following:
(a) Compute c = comm(0n) and send it to A.
(b) Obtain b ∈ {0, 1}n from A.
(c) Run Gen(1n) to obtain (pk, sk). Send a = pk⊕ b to A.
(d) Run the simulator S1 for ZK1 with input (c, a).
3. In Phase 2, S obtains (x, e) and executes ZK2 with A. If ZK2 succeeds, S decrypts e to get
w = Decsk(e) and sends (x,w) to FZK.
4. S outputs whatever A outputs.
Let MFZK,S be the QTM of ideal-world interaction between S ,FZK and V; and let MΠZK,A(P) describing
real-world interaction between A and V.
Lemma 4.13. MΠZK,A(P) ≈qc MFZK,S .
Proof. We define a sequence of machines to form a hybrid argument:
Now it is easy to see:
• M0 ≈qc M1. These two QTMs would behave differently only if ZK2 succeeds but w is not a valid
witness. Namely A (corrupted prover) has managed to prove a false statement that e encodes a true
witness. By soundness property of ZK2, however, this only occurs with negligible probability.
• Machines M1, . . . ,M4 form a simple hybrid argument. More specifically, each adjacent pair of ma-
chines constitutes simply related machines:
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Hybrid Machines: relating MΠZK,A(P) and MFZK,S
• M0 := MFZK,S . Specifically, on any input state, the output has two parts: one part corre-
sponds to the adversaryA’s output state, and the other corresponds to the dummy verifier’s
output, which is accepting if w obtained by S in step 3 is a valid witness, i.e., (x,w) ∈ RL.
• M1: differ from M0 only in that M1 always let the dummy verifier accept as long as ZK2
succeeds.
• M2: differs from M1 in the message a in Phase 1: instead of sending pk ⊕ b, in M2,
a← {0, 1}n is set to be a uniformly random string.
• M3: in the first step of Phase 1,M3 commits to a instead of committing to 0n.
• M4: instead of running simulator S1, M4 executes the actual ZK1 protocol. Observe that
M4 ≡ MΠZK,A(P).
– M1 and M2 are simply related by switching valid public keys to uniformly random strings.
– M2 and M3 are simply related by changing the messages being committed to.
– M3 and M4 are simply related via a pair of indistinguishable QTMs Na and Nb, where Na is the
simulator S1, and Nb is the machine describing ZK1.
Thus MΠZK,A(P) ≈qc MFZK,S .
Verifier is Corrupted. We construct ideal world S for any adversaryA that corrupts the verifier as follows:
Simulator S: Verifier is corrupted
Input: A as a black box; security parameter 1n.
1. S initializes A with whatever input state it receives.
2. Wait till get x from FZK. Then do the following.
3. In Phase 1, S behave honestly and aborts if A aborts. Let the outcome be pk.
4. In Phase 2:
(a) S picks an arbitrary string, say 0w(n), and send e = Encpk(0w(n)) to A.
(b) S runs the simulator S2 for ZK2 with input (pk, e, x).
5. S outputs whatever A outputs.
Let MFZK,S be the QTM of ideal-world interaction between P,FZK and S ; and let MΠZK,A(V) describing
the real-world interaction between P and A.
Lemma 4.14. MΠZK,A(V) ≈qc MFZK,S .
Proof. The proof again follows a hybrid argument. We define the following hybrids.
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Hybrid Machines: relating MΠZK,A(V) and MFZK,S
• M0 := MΠZK,A(V).
• M1: M1 runs the simulator S2 instead of invoking the actual ZK2 protocol.
• M2: M2 encrypts 0w(n) instead of a valid witness w. Observe that M2 ≡ MFZK,S .
Clearly machines M0 and M1 are simply related via a pair of QTMs Na and Nb, where Na is the simula-
tor S2, and Nb is the machine describing ZK2. Hence they are quantum computationally indistinguishable.
Showing indistinguishability of M1 and M2 slightly deviates from our simple hybrid argument framework.
We will modify M1 and M2 to get two machines Mˆ1 and Mˆ2 which may run in super-polynomial time. We
can then show that Mˆ1 ≈qc Mˆ26, and that Mˆ1 ≈qc Mˆ2 implies M1 ≈qc M2.
Specifically Mˆ1 makes one change from M1: if corrupted verifier aborts during Phase 1, P extracts
aˆ from c using possibly super-polynomial-time brute-force search. Because the commitment scheme is
statistically binding, there is a well-defined aˆ with overwhelming probability. In addition, soundness of ZK1
ensures that aˆ = a except for negligible soundness error. In this way, P still gets pk := a⊕ b and we let P
send Encpk(w) to the verifier even in case of abort. Mˆ2 is modified similarly. Namely a (super-polynomial-
time) simulator extracts pk and sends Encpk(0w(n)) in case of abort.
Note that Mˆ1 and Mˆ2 are simply related by switching the plaintexts, and therefore Mˆ1 ≈qc Mˆ2 follows
by our simple hybrid argument framework. Next we claim that if Mˆ1 ≈qc Mˆ2, then M1 ≈qc M2. This is
because that if there exists a distinguisher D that tells apart M1 and M2, then one can as well distinguish
Mˆ1 from Mˆ2 by ignoring the ciphertext in case of aborting and then invoking D.
Therefore we have that MΠZK,A(V) ≈qc MFZK,S .
Finally, we conclude that Theorem 4.9 holds.
4.3 Putting It Together
Recall the results that we have obtained so far:
(a) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any well-formed two-party functionality F , there is a classical pro-
tocol piFZK that quantum-UC emulates F in the FZK-hybrid model. (Theorem 4.1)
(b) Under Assumption 1 and 2, There exists classical protocol piZK that C-QSA emulates FZK. (Theo-
rem 4.9)
Applying our modular composition theorem (Theorem 3.4) to the above, we obtain the main theorem:
Theorem 4.15. For any well-formed classical two-party functionality F , there exists a classical protocol
Π that C-QSA realizes F against malicious static quantum adversaries in the plain model, under Assump-
tions 1 and 2.
6Although the machines Mˆ are not necessarily poly-time, we can still talk about distinguishing them by poly-time distinguishers
according to Definition 2.3. If the output register of Mˆ exceeds the dimension of the input of the distinguisher, we assume that the
distinguisher just takes an arbitrary portion that fits.
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5 Equivalence Between FZK and FCF
We have seen that FZK functionality is sufficient to realize any other functionality. It is interesting to find
out if this holds as well for other functionalities. More generally, we may ask what the relations of different
functionalities are. In this section, we show that FZK and FCF are equivalent in the sense that one can be
UC-realized from the other.
Theorem 5.1 (Equivalence between FZK and FCF). (a) Under Assumption 1, there is a constant-round
protocol ΠFZKCF that C-QUC emulates FCF in the FZK-hybrid model.
(b) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there is a constant-round protocol ΠFCFZK that C-QUC emulates FZK in the
FCF-hybrid model.
It is possible to obtain more connections between different functionalities. For example, [14] gives a ZK
protocol that statistically UC and hence C-QUC emulates FZK in the FCOM-hybrid model. On the other hand,
our Theorem 4.1 implies that FCOM can be C-QUC realized in FZK-hybrid model. Thus FZK and FCOM are
equivalent in the computationally quantum-UC model. See [34] for a systematic study of the reducibility
and characterizing functionalities in the quantum UC model.
5.1 From FZK to FCF
Theorem 4.1 already implies that FCF can be C-QUC realized from FZK-hybrid model. However, that relies
on the generic construction of CLOS, which is typically not optimal in terms of the number of rounds (i.e.,
round complexity) and the amount of messages exchanged (i.e., communication complexity). Here we give
a direct reduction which is simple and more efficient. Specifically, we show that the parallel coin-flipping
protocol of Lindell [50], once executed in FZK-hybrid model, i.e., the (stand-alone) ZKAoK protocol is
replaced by the ideal protocol for FZK, is C-QUC secure. This yields a constant-round protocol for FCF, and
we need only Assumption 1: existence of a quantum-secure PRG. The protocol is shown below.
Coin-Flipping Protocol ΠFZKCF
1. A chooses a← {0, 1}n at random, and sends B a commitment of a: c = comm(a, r).
2. A proves knowledge of (a, r) using FZK.
3. B sends b← {0, 1}n to A.
4. A sends B string a.
5. A proves to B that c is indeed a commitment of a using FZK.
6. A and B set s = a⊕ b as the outcome.
We give proofs for corrupted A and corrupted B separately.
Player A is Corrupted. We construct an ideal world S for any adversary A corrupting A.
Claim 5.2. For any A corrupting A, MΠFZKCF ,A ≈qci MFCF,S .
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Simulator S: A is corrupted
Input: A as a black box; security parameter 1n
1. S initializes A with whatever input state it receives from the environment.
2. S obtains s from FCF which is chosen uniformly at random s← {0, 1}n.
3. S receives a commitment c from A.
4. A shows knowledge of (a, r) to FZK, which is emulated by S here. S verifies if c =
comm(a, r) and aborts if not. This allows S to learn a.
5. S sends b = a⊕ s to A.
6. A sends a to S . S aborts if A sends some other string not equal to a.
7. A needs to prove that c is a valid commitment of a. It sends ((c, a), r) to FZK. S verifies them.
Abort if verification fails.
8. IfA aborts at any point, S aborts FCF. Otherwise, instruct FCF to send s to the other (dummy)
party B˜.
9. S outputs whatever A outputs.
Proof. Because s is chosen uniformly, b = a ⊕ s is also uniformly random. The adversary must behave
identical in the real world and the ideal world, and the two machines will look identical from the perspective
of the environment.
Player B is Corrupted. For any real-world adversary A that corrupts B, we construct an ideal-world
adversary S .
Claim 5.3. For any A corrupting B, MΠFZKCF ,A ≈qci MFCF,S .
Proof. We define an intermediate machine M which behaves differently from MFCF,S merely in that a
uniformly random string a ← {0, 1}n is chosen and sent to A in M, instead of sending a = s⊕ b. Then
observe that the only difference between M and MΠFZKCF ,A appears in the first commitment message: M
commits to 0n while MΠFZKCF ,A commits to a. Hence we can claim that:
• MFCF,S ≡ M since s is chosen uniformly at random by FCF and hence s⊕ b is still uniformly random
just as a in M. Thus the two machines are identical.
• M ≈qci MΠFZKCF ,A because they are simply related by changing the underlying message of a commit-ment.
5.2 From FCF to FZK
We construct a classical constant-round protocol for FZK in the FCF-hybrid model. Our ΠFCFZK protocol uses
a standard transformation from a witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof system in the FCF-hybrid model.
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Simulator S: B is corrupted
Input: A as a black box; security parameter 1n
1. S initializes A with whatever input state it receives from the environment.
2. S obtains s from FCF which is chosen uniformly at random s← {0, 1}n.
3. S computes c = comm(0n) and sends it to A.
4. S plays the role of FZK and sends c to A.
5. Obtain b ∈ {0, 1}n from A.
6. S sends a = s⊕ b to A.
7. S mimics FZK and sends (c, a) to A.
8. If A aborts at any point, S aborts.
9. S outputs whatever A outputs.
We give a definition for WI against quantum adversaries and show a repetition theorem analogous to the
classical setting to amplify the soundness of WI protocols. We also show that Blum’s 3-round ZK protocol
for Hamiltonian Cycle is in fact quantum-secure WI under suitable assumptions.
Definition 5.4 (Quantum computationally witness-indistinguishable QC-WI). Let Π = 〈P,V〉 be an inter-
active proof (or argument) system for a language L ∈ NP. We say Π is quantum computational witness-
indistinguishable for RL, if for any polynomial-time QIM V∗, any two collections {w1x}x∈L and {w2x}x∈L
with wix ∈ RL(x), i = 1, 2, the two machines M1 := {Mw1x ,V∗}x∈L and M2 := {Mw2x ,V∗}x∈L are quantum
computationally indistinguishable (i.e., M1 ≈qc M2). Here Mwix ,V∗ denotes the composed machine of P
and V∗ on instance x, and P uses witness wix.
We know that classically WI is preserved under parallel repetition when the prover is efficient [36]. By
a similar argument, one can also show that QC-WI protocols remain QC-WI under parallel reception. This
is useful for reducing the soundness error of a QC-WI protocol. Here we only state this property and skip
the proof.
Lemma 5.5 (Parallel composition of QC-WI protocols). Let L ∈ NP and suppose that 〈P,V〉 is a QC-WI
for RL and P is polynomial time given a witness. Let q(·) be a polynomial and let 〈Pq,Vq〉 be machines so
that they invoke 〈P,V〉 q-times in parallel. Specifically, on common input {xi : i = 1, . . . , q} and (private)
input {wi : i = 1, . . . , q} to Pq, the ith invocation is 〈P(wi),V〉(xi). Then 〈Pq,Vq〉 is QC-WI for the
relation
RqL := {({xi : i = 1, . . . , q}, {wi : i = 1, . . . , q}) : ∀i, (xi,wi) ∈ RL} .
It is easy to see that quantum ZK implies QC-WI. Meanwhile if we use a statistically binding and
quantum computationally hiding commitment (as the one following Assumption 1) in Blum’s basic (3-
round) ZK protocol [10], we can show that the resulting protocol, call it HCQ, is quantum ZK using the
techniques from [72]. Therefore, we claim that HCQ is QC-WI. Using a polynomial number of parallel
27
repetitions of HCQ, we have a QC-WI protocol for NP with negligible soundness error which we call ΠWI
and will use in later constructions.
We now construct piFCFZK that quantum-UC emulates FZK in the FCF-hybrid model.
Let L be an NP language and RL be the corresponding NP-relation. Let PG be a quantum secure
pseudorandom generator as in Assumption 1, and let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme as in
Assumption 2. We define another relation
R = {((x1, x2, pk, e), wˆ)|(wˆ = (w, r) ∧ Encpk(w, r) = e ∧ (x1,w) ∈ RL) or (PG(wˆ) = x2)} .
It is clear that R is an NP-relation, and thus there is a WI proof for R. The key idea of constructing ΠFCFFZK
is to exploit the outcome of the coin-flipping in some clever way. We will interpret the coins s as two parts
(s1, s2), where s1 = pk will be used as a public key pk for E , and s2 will sometimes be an output string of
PG. Our ΠFCFZK has a simple form then: P and V get s = (s1, s2), P sends x and e = Encs1(w) to V, and
next they run a WI protocol on (x1 = x, x2 = s2, pk = s1, e) using witness w. Intuitively, if the adversary
A corrupts the verifier V, then S can choose a fake s′ = (s′1, s′2) where s′2 is generated by PG with random
seed r, i.e., s′2 = PG(r). Then it generates an arbitrary ciphertext as e and uses r as a witness in the WI
proof, and witness-indistinguishability ensures the A can not distinguish from the case where P uses a real
witness w of x. If the prover is corrupted, S can simply generate (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n) and assign pk as s′1,
while s′2 is still uniformly chosen. Therefore, whenever A convinces S in the WI protocol, S then decrypts
(it knows sk) w = Decsk(e). However, there is one subtlety. Namely, R has two witnesses, either a real w
(which is what we really ask for) s.t. (x,w) ∈ RL or a random seed r s.t. PG(r) = s′2. We do not want
A to be capable of achieving the latter case. This is easy to guarantee though, because we can choose a
generator PG with sufficient expansion factor, e.g., if PG : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}3n. Then given a uniformly
random 3n-bit string s′2, the probability that there is a seed r ∈ {0, 1}n getting mapped to s′2 is negligible.
Thus whenever a prover succeeds in WI, it must have proved the statement with respect to RL rather than
with respect to PG. The formal description of protocol ΠFCFZK follows.
UC-secure ZKAoK Protocol ΠFCFZK
(a) P and V get s = (s1, s2) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}3n from FCF.
(b) P sends x and e = Encs1(w, r) to V.
(c) P and V invoke a WI protocol ΠWI for relation R with input instance (x1 = x, x2 =
s2, pk = s1, e). P uses (w, r) as a witness for (x1, x2, pk, e).
(d) V accepts if it accepts in ΠWI .
Lemma 5.6. The classical protocol ΠFCFZK C-QUC emulates FZK.
Proof. We first deal with the case in which the prover is corrupted.
Claim 5.7. For any A corrupting the prover, MΠFCFZK ,A(P) ≈qci MFZK,S .
Proof. Note that in the ideal world, if (x,w) /∈ RL, the dummy verifier will reject. Define an intermediate
machine M in whichFZK always sends x to the dummy verifier (i.e. it accepts), and M is identical to MFZK,S
otherwise. M and MFZK,S behave differently only when ΠWI succeeds but somehow (x,w) /∈ RL. This
however violates the soundness property of ΠWI . Hence MFZK,S ≈qci M. Then M and MΠFCFZK ,A(P) are
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Simulator S: prover is corrupted
Input: adversary A ; security parameter 1n.
(a) S initializes A with whatever input state it receives from the environment.
(b) S internally generates (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n) and set s′1 = pk. Choose s′2 ← {0, 1}3n
uniformly at random. Let s′ = (s′1, s
′
2) be the fake coins and it is given to A.
(c) When S receives (x, e) from A, it decrypts e to get w = Decsk(e).
(d) S runs ΠWI with A on input instance (x, s′2, s′1, e) where S plays the role of a verifier. If
S accepts in ΠWI , it sends (x,w) to FZK.
(e) S outputs whatever A outputs.
simply related by switching between a valid public key and a truly random string. The lemma then follows
from Assumption 2.
Now we consider the case where A corrupts the verifier.
Simulator S: verifier is corrupted
Input: given adversary A; security parameter 1n;
(a) S initializes A with whatever input state it receives from the environment.
(b) Wait till it receives x fromFZK. Then S internally generates s′1 ← {0, 1}n. It also generates
r ← {0, 1}n and sets s′2 = PG(r). Let s′ = (s′1, s′2) be the fake coins and it is given to A.
(c) S sends x and e = Encs′1(0n) to A and then invokes ΠWI with A on input instance
(x, s′2, s′1, e). S uses r as a witness.
(d) S outputs whatever A outputs.
Claim 5.8. For any A corrupting the verifier, MΠFCFZK ,A(V) ≈qci MFZK,S .
Proof. We define a sequence of indistinguishable machines as follows.
Now we can see that:
• M0 ≈qci M1 because they simply related by changing the plaintext of encryption e.
• M1 ≈qci M2 because ΠWI is QC-WI. Otherwise we can construct a malicious V∗ such that Mw1x ,V∗
and Mw2x ,V∗ become distinguishable.
• M2 ≈qci M3 because they are simply related by switching a pseudorandom string to a uniformly
random string.
Thus Claim 5.8 holds.
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• M0 := MFZK,S . The ideal-world machine describing P,S and FZK as a single interactive
machine.
• M1: same as M0 except that the ciphertext is changed from Encs′1(0n) to e = Encs′1(w).
Here w is a witness for x, i.e., RL(x,w) = 1.
• M2: identical to M1 except that M2 uses w as a witness in the ΠWI .
• M3: s′2 is also chosen uniformly random, rather than pseudorandom. Note M3 is exactly
the real-world machine MΠFCFZK ,A(V).
We finally get ΠFCFZK quantum-UC emulates FZK.
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A Proof of Modular Composition Theorem
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let Π′ := ΠΓ/Γ′ be the composed protocol. We show the theorem in the computa-
tional setting, and proofs for the statistical and perfect settings are analogous. Specifically, we need to show
that
∀A ∃S : MΠ′,S ≈qc MΠ,A .
Without loss of generality, we assume that Π only calls Γ once. The proof will proceed in three steps:
(a) From any adversary A attacking Π′, we construct another adversary AΓ′ attacking Γ′. Notice that Γ′
is a subroutine in Π′. Basically AΓ′ consists of the segment of the circuits of A during the subroutine
call of Γ′.
(b) By the assumption that Γ′ C-QSA emulates Γ, we know that ∀AΓ′∃AΓ : MΓ′,AΓ′ ≈qc MΓ,AΓ . This
gives us an adversary AΓ.
(c) Finally the adversary S will be constructed by “composing” the machines A and AΓ: when Π makes
the subroutine call to Γ, S runs AΓ, otherwise it follows the operations of A. Then MΠ′,A ≈qc MΠ,S
basically follows from MΓ′,AΓ′ ≈qc MΓ,AΓ .
Next we give the details.
Step 1 (Constructing AΓ′ from A). Adversary AΓ′ represents the segment of A during the subroutine Γ′.
It starts with some state that supposedly represents the joint state in an execution of Π′ with A right before
the invocation of Γ′. It then runs A till completion of Γ′.
Adversary AΓ′
Input: adversary A; security parameter 1n;
(a) AΓ′ initiates A with whatever input it receives from the environment. It then runs A in the
execution of Γ′.
(b) When Γ′ terminates, AΓ′ outputs the state on all of A’s registers.
Step 2 (Simulating AΓ′ by AΓ). This step is straightforward from the hypothesis that Γ′ C-QSA emulates
Γ, which means that ∀AΓ′∃AΓ : MΓ′,AΓ′ ≈wqc MΓ,AΓ .
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Step 3 (Constructing S from AΓ and A). The construction is as described above. Here we show that
MΠ′,A ≈qc MΠ,S . Suppose for contradiction that there exists a distinguisher Z and state7 σn such that:∣∣∣Pr[Z((1L(R) ⊗MΠ,A)(σn)) = 1]− Pr[Z((1L(R) ⊗MΠ′,S )(σn)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ε(n) ,
with ε(n) ≥ 1/poly(n). We show a distinguisher Z˜ and state σ˜n such that on input σ˜n, MΓ′,AΓ′ and MΓ,AΓ
becomes distinguishable under Z˜ .
• Let σ˜n be the joint state of executing Π′ in the presence of A on input σn right before the invocation
of Γ′. Clearly it is identical to the joint state of executing Π in the presence of S on input σn right
before the invocation of Γ.
• Distinguisher Z˜ runs the circuits of A after execution of the subroutine Γ′ (equivalently the circuits
of S after execution of the subroutine Γ) and then runs Z .
It is easy to see that
Z˜((1L(R) ⊗MΓ′,AΓ′ )(σ˜n)) ≡ Z((1L(R) ⊗MΠ′,A)(σn))
and Z˜((1L(R) ⊗MΓ,AΓ)(σ˜n)) ≡ Z((1L(R) ⊗MΠ,S )(σn)) ,
where “≡” means identical distributions. This implies that∣∣∣Pr[Z˜((1L(R) ⊗MΓ′,AΓ′ )(σ˜n)) = 1]− Pr[Z˜((1L(R) ⊗MΓ,AΓ)(σ˜n)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≥ ε(n) .
This contradicts the assumption that MΓ′,AΓ′ ≈qc MΓ,AΓ .
This concludes our proof for the modular composition theorem.
B A Special Constraint in Quantum Stand-Alone Model: Markov Condi-
tion
Another choice exists in the literature [27, 32], where a stand-alone model was proposed to capture secure
emulation of classical functionalities. Only a special form of inputs is allowed there, which satisfy what
we call the Markov condition. As opposed to a general bipartite state with one part being classical (a.k.a
cq-states): ρAB = ∑a λa|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρaB, the Markov condition requires that the input to dishonest Bob contains
a classical subsystem Y such that conditioned on Y Bob’s quantum input is independent of Alice’s classical
input. Such states are denoted as
ρA↔Y↔B =∑
a,b
λa,b|a〉〈a|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|Y ⊗ ρbB .
Now let us analyze how Markov condition affects our abstract model discussed above. It turns out that
the effect of Markov condition, again, depends on whether Z1 takes quantum advice.
Z1 takes quantum advice: Markov condition becomes redundant. We denote models with Markov
conditionM∗.
Lemma B.1. M∗aux1,·,· ≡Maux1,·,· regardless of the choices for aux2 and state passing. Namely, the model
where inputs must satisfy Markov condition is equivalent to the model where inputs could be any bipartite
cq-states.
7More precisely there exists a family of states {σn}n∈N.
36
Proof. To be concrete, we consider two modelsM := Maux1,aux2,state andM′ := M∗aux1,aux2,state. The
same argument applies to other cases.
One direction is obvious, namely, if a protocol Π emulates Γ inM then it automatically holds that Π
emulates Γ inM′. This is because we can think of the Markov condition as specifying a subclass of possible
Z1 allowed inM. Now we show the converse by contradiction. Specifically, we prove that if there is an
adversary A in M, and ∀S , there exist (Z1,Z2) such that Z2 can distinguish MΠ,A and MΓ,S , then in
modelM′ we construct A′,Z ′1 and Z ′2 such that no S ′ that is able to simulate A′. By our hypothesis, there
is an input state σn, which can always be written as ∑a λa|a〉〈a|A ⊗ σaB with ∑i λi = 1 such that
|Pr[Z2(MΠ,A(σn)) = 1]− Pr[Z2(MΓ,S (σn)) = 1]| ≥ 1/poly(n)
holds for any poly-time S . Observe that each summand |a〉〈a|A ⊗ σaB of σn trivially satisfies Markov con-
dition. Since σn is a convex combination of |a〉〈a|A ⊗ σaB, there must be a σ˜n = |a˜〉〈a˜|A ⊗ σa˜B such that
|Pr[Z2(MΠ,A(σ˜n)) = 1]− Pr[Z2(MΓ,S (σ˜n)) = 1]| ≥ 1/poly(n) ,
for any poly-time S . This observation tells us that we can simply let A′ := A,Z ′2 := Z2, and let Z ′1 be the
machine that takes quantum advice {σ˜n} and hands σ˜n to players as input. Then for any poly-time S ′,∣∣Pr[Z ′2(MΠ,A′(σ˜n)) = 1]− Pr[Z ′2(MΓ,S ′(σ˜n)) = 1]∣∣
= |Pr[Z2(MΠ,A(σ˜n)) = 1]− Pr[Z2(MΓ,S ′(σ˜n)) = 1]| ≥ 1/poly(n) .
This shows that emulation inM′ implies emulation inM.
Z1 Takes No Quantum Advice: Markov Condition may Matter. The argument in Lemma B.1 does not
necessarily apply here because previously we could simply give σ∗n to Z1 directly as an advice. However, σ∗n
might be impossible to generate on a poly-time QTM. It is interesting to either construct a concrete example
to show a separation or otherwise showing a proof of equivalence. We do not have clear insight into the
Markov condition in this case, and leave the possibility of a separation as an open question.
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